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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW—CLEAN WATER ACT—THE “MIGRATORY
BIRD RULE” EXCEEDS THE AUTHORITY GRANTED TO THE UNITED
STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS UNDER SECTION 404(a) OF THE
CLEAN WATER ACT—Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001).
A consortium comprised of twenty-three suburban Chicago
municipalities, the Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County
(SWANCC), sought to develop land formerly used in a sand and
gravel mining operation as a disposal site for baled nonhazardous
solid waste. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001). SWANCC filed for,
and received, permits from both the State of Illinois and Cook
County for the proposed disposal operation.
SWANCC also
contacted the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to determine
whether the Clean Water Act (CWA) required SWANCC to secure a
federal landfill permit because it was planned to fill-in ponds on the
site. After first concluding that it had no jurisdiction because the
site did not contain “wetlands,” the Corps reversed its decision and
ultimately asserted jurisdiction under the “Migratory Bird Rule”
after learning that the area was used as a habitat by several
migratory bird species. Although SWANCC received approval
from the appropriate state authorities and offered several proposals
to mitigate the likely harm to various bird species, the Corps denied
SWANCC a permit under section 404(a) of the CWA, citing
probable environmental damage, risk to the area’s drinking water
supply, and the likely negative impact on migratory bird species.
SWANCC sought relief in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois. Id. at 679. Presented with a challenge
to both the Corps’ jurisdiction over the proposed dump site and the
merits of the Corps’ refusal to issue the section 404(a) permit, the
District Court granted summary judgment to the Corps with regard
to jurisdiction. Id. SWANCC thereafter withdrew its challenge to
the merits of the Corps’ refusal to issue the permit. Id. Thereafter,
SWANCC appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Id. On appeal, SWANCC launched a two-pronged attack. Id.
SWANCC first argued that, in promulgating the “Migratory Bird
Rule,” the Corps had gone beyond its statutory authority by
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interpreting the scope of the CWA to include non-navigable,
intrastate
bodies of water. Id. Alternatively, SWANCC argued that the
Commerce Clause did not support Congress’ grant of such
jurisdiction to the Corps. Id.
Turning to the constitutional issue first, the court of appeals
held that the regulation of such waters was within Congress’
authority based on the cumulative impact doctrine. Id. The court of
appeals explained that under the cumulative impact doctrine, “a
single activity that itself has no discernible effect on interstate
commerce may still be regulated if the aggregate effect of that class
of activity has a substantial impact on interstate commerce.” Id.
(citation and internal quotes omitted). The court held that the
aggregate effect of the potential damage to various migratory bird
species on interstate commerce was substantial given the fact that a
significant number of Americans spend billions of dollars and travel
across state lines to observe and hunt such birds. Id. With respect to
the “Migratory Bird Rule,” the court of appeals stated that, in light
of the court’s expansive reading of the Commerce Clause, the Corps’
“Migratory Bird Rule” constituted a reasonable interpretation of the
CWA. Id. at 679-80.
Upon SWANCC’s petition, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed. Id. at 680. The Court held that in
promulgating and applying the “Migratory Bird Rule,” the Corps
had exceeded the authority granted to it by section 404(a) of the
CWA. Id.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist began the
Court’s analysis by noting that in passing the CWA, Congress
sought to protect the integrity of the country’s waters while
preserving the States’ primary rights and responsibilities in
eliminating pollution and planning for the development of both
land and water resources. Id. The Court observed that section
404(a) of the CWA authorizes the Corps to regulate the disposal of
waste into “navigable waters,” defined by the statute as “the waters
of the United States, including the territorial seas.” Id. (quoting 33
U.S.C. § 1362(7)).
The Court concluded that the Corps’
interpretation of the CWA to include isolated waters that serve as a
habitat for migratory birds is not supported by the language of the
statute. Id.
The majority next distinguished this case from United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985), in which the Court
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held that the Corps had properly asserted 404(a) jurisdiction over an
intrastate wetlands area. Id. In contrasting the two cases, the Court
emphasized that the waters in Riverside Bayview abutted a navigable
waterway, while the ponds in this case were not situated near any
open water. Id.

Turning to the question of Congressional acquiescence with
regard to the “Migratory Bird Rule,” the Chief Justice observed that
the Corps’ original interpretation of the CWA contradicted its
interpretation of the statute in this case. Id. The Corps’ original
definition of “navigable waters,” the court observed, stated that the
determining factor was the water’s ability to be used by the public
for transportation or commerce. Id.
The Court also rejected the Corps’ argument that Congress
ultimately approved of the Corps’ more expansive definition of the
term “navigable,” as evidenced by both the failure to pass a bill that
would have overturned the Corps regulations, and the passage of
404(g), which extends the Corps’ jurisdiction to waterways other
than those considered traditional navigable waters. Id. at 681. The
majority voiced its reluctance to interpret a present statute based on
a failed legislative proposal. Id. (citations omitted). Finding that the
Corps had produced “no persuasive evidence that the House bill
was proposed in response to the Corps’ claim of jurisdiction over
nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate, waters,” the Chief Justice
concluded that the Corps fell short of carrying its burden of
showing that the failure of the bill signaled Congress’ acceptance of
the Corps’ regulations. Id. at 682.
Examining the text of section 404(g), the majority stated that the
exact definition of the term “other . . . waters” was unclear. Id. The
Court observed that “other . . . waters” could mean the types of
isolated waters the Corps sought to regulate under the “Migratory
Bird Rule,” or it could signify waterways adjacent to navigable
bodies of water. Id. Given this ambiguity, the Court found that
“‘§404(g)(1) does not conclusively determine the construction to be
placed on the term “waters” elsewhere in the Act . . . .’” Id. (quoting
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 138 n.11).
Further, the Chief Justice voiced the Court’s refusal to read the
word “navigable” out of the statute by relying solely on the
definitional phrase “waters of the United States.” Id. The majority
acknowledged that in Riverside Bayview the Court indicated that the
term “navigable” in the CWA was of “limited effect,” not
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ineffective. Id. at 682-83. The Court asserted that the term remained
important as a sign that, in passing the CWA, Congress had relied
on its traditional authority to regulate navigable waters. Id. at 683.
The Chief Justice then proceeded to address the Corps’
argument that Congress had never specifically answered the
question of the scope of section 404(a), and thus the Court should
give deference to the Corps’ regulations. Id. The Court declined to
defer to the Corps’ rules because the Corps’ interpretation of the
CWA reached the furthermost boundaries of Congress’ power. Id.
The majority explained that, in the absence of clear congressional
intent, the Court would construe the Act to avoid Constitutional
issues, especially when such construction implicated a change in the
traditional federal-state balance. Id. The Court further noted that
the “Migratory Bird Rule” presented such a quandary given that the
power granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause is not
unlimited, and there remained the question of whether migratory
birds “substantially affect” interstate commerce. Id. The Court thus
held that the Corps’ application of the Migratory Bird Rule to
SWANCC’s disposal site exceeded the power granted to the Corps
under the CWA. Id. at 684.
Writing for the dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, began by observing that Congress
enacted the CWA with the lofty goal of terminating water pollution
by 1985. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Given that Congress’ hope
remains unfulfilled, the dissent lamented that the majority’s
decision would serve only to weaken the Nation’s most important
safeguard against polluted water. Id.
The dissent then traced the history of federal water regulation.
Id. at 685 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens described the shift
in legislative focus from protecting the navigability of waterways in
the nineteenth century, to preventing environmental damage to the
country’s waters in the twentieth century. Id. at 685-86 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Noting that the CWA “was universally described by its
supporters as the first truly comprehensive federal water pollution
legislation,” the dissent asserted that the passage of the Act in 1972
marked the climax in this movement toward environmental
protection. Id. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent contrasted
section 404 of the CWA with section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1152, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §
407 (RHA). Id. at 687 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent stated
that, although the two statutes were similar in some respects, the
statutes differed markedly with respect to purpose, as evidenced by
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surveys and studies for improvements in navigation facilities
contained in the RHA, and by large appropriations for research on
water pollution control in the CWA. Id. The dissent emphasized
that in creating the CWA, Congress had carried over the traditional
term “navigable waters,” as used in the RHA, but had deliberately
expanded the definition of the term to include all “waters of the
United States.” Id.
The dissent reminded the Court that the new definition “was
intended to be given the broadest possible constitutional
interpretation.” Id. (citation and internal quotes omitted). The
dissent reasoned that, in recording its desire for broad
interpretation, Congress could not have been referring to its
authority over navigation, which had long been established as a core
power under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 687-88 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
Rather, the dissent noted, Congress referred to
jurisdiction well beyond that traditional territory. Id. at 688
(Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent
maintained that it was Congress, not the Corps, that had read the
term “navigable” out of the CWA when it deleted the word from the
statutory definition. Id.
Justice Stevens explained that it was this broadened definition
of the Corps’ jurisdiction, which was clarified in interim regulations
adopted in 1975 and in final regulations adopted in 1977, which
sparked opposition from some Members of Congress. Id. at 688-89
(Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent observed that a bill restricting
the Corps’ section 404 authority to only those waters used for
interstate or foreign commerce was passed by the House, but was
ultimately rejected by the Senate in 1977. Id. at 690 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The dissent interpreted this failed legislation, as well as
the informed debate surrounding the proposal, as a clear sign that
Congress accepted the Corps’ expanded jurisdiction under the Act.
Id. Moreover, the dissent declared that the Court’s finding of
congressional acquiescence to the same regulations in Riverside
Bayview foreclosed any contrary conclusion. Id.
Accusing the majority of selective reading, the dissent stated
that in Riverside Bayview the Court held that the Corps regulations at
issue were entitled to administrative deference under Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Id.
at 693 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens urged that the
majority’s concerns regarding federalism were misplaced because
the CWA is not a land-use statute, but rather an environmental
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regulation that explicitly encourages local control by allowing States
to develop their own regulatory programs to take the place of
federal control. Id.
Turning to the issue of whether Congress has the power under
the Commerce Clause to regulate SWANCC’s proposed disposal
site, the dissent identified three categories of activities that Congress
may regulate pursuant to its commerce power: “(1) channels of
interstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons and things in interstate commerce; and (3) activities that
‘substantially affect’ interstate commerce.” Id. at 694 (citing United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995)) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The dissent indicated that the “Migratory Bird Rule” fell into the
third category, which does not require that each instance of the
activity substantially affect interstate commerce, merely that the
activity taken as a whole have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. Id. (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971)).
Noting the intrinsic value of migratory birds, as well as the
significant commercial value of both bird-watching and hunting, the
dissent determined that the disposal of fill into the SWANCC site
would substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. at 695 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
Furthermore, the dissent characterized the
preservation of migratory birds as a “textbook example of a national
problem.” Id. Justice Stevens stated that, like other environmental
problems, the damage to the bird habitat would result in
disproportionately local benefits, such as the new disposal site,
while the costs (fewer birds) would be widely dispersed. Id.
Finally, the dissent observed that the federal government’s
responsibility for protecting migratory birds is well established, and
given the birds’ transitory nature, national action stands as the only
effective means of fulfilling that duty. Id. at 696 (Stevens, J.
dissenting). Thus, the dissent concluded that the regulation of the
“isolated” waters in this case was well within Congress’ authority
under the Commerce Clause. Id.
The majority’s opinion is deceptively appealing in its
simplicity. The dissent’s more detailed and in-depth analysis,
however, is more cogent. Congress clearly intended the Corps’
jurisdiction to extend to waters not considered navigable in an effort
to formulate a truly comprehensive environmental protection
program. The Court’s opinion may ignore Congress’ intent, leaving
wetlands across the country exposed to potentially irreversible
environmental degradation.
Moreover, although the majority
declined to rest its opinion on the Commerce Clause issue, the
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Court’s dicta regarding Congress’ commerce power is disconcerting.
The Court’s reading of Congress’ authority under the Commerce
Clause as more limited than traditionally defined may foreshadow a
narrowing judicial scrutiny of legislation passed pursuant to the
commerce power, including other environmental measures and civil
rights legislation.
Jennifer Mara

